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The U.S. government recently finished its  five year ritual of farm
legislation.  In general,  the 1990 Farm Bill extends most of the program
features of its predecessor, the Food Security Act of 1985  (FSA).  The
recent bill continues  a 57  year old tradition represented by loan rates,
target prices, deficiency payments, base acres and yields,  quotas,
production controls, marketing loans,  and other devices which support
prices and income in return for retiring acres.  However, the bill
introduces  several features that move it  incrementally in the direction of
"decoupling",  and continues  the trend set in 1985 of adding new
environmental restrictions on farm practices.
The recently passed Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of
1990 was shaped by four forces;  these  forces will continue to  shape U.S.
farm policy throughout the nineties.  First, the rising budget deficit
compelled Congressional agriculture committee members  to  decrease the cost
of their programs.  Second, a call for more open agricultural markets
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1by the Bush Administration coupled with the budget constraint made smaller
and more flexible crop acreage bases the most attractive way to  achieve
incremental decoupling.  Third, recent scares of pesticides and
agricultural chemicals on or  in food and groundwater have  led to rising
concerns  over the  impact of agriculture on the environment.  Fourth, the
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations was an important consideration in
drafting the  first farm bill of the nineties.
Background -- The Food Security Act of 1985
The Food Security Act of 1985  provides a good background for  the  1990
legislation since it differs only slightly.  In 1985,  the Reagan White
House attempted substantially to  reduce the  role of government in
agriculture, citing the need to decrease budget costs  and to  return "market
orientation"  to  agricultural programs.  Neither objective was fully
achieved;  although the 1985 bill reduced loan rates and helped to expand
export markets, it  did so  at great cost.  In 1986,  at the high water mark
of agricultural spending, the cost of farm price and income support
programs rose to  $26 billion.
One result of the administration's  push to make agriculture more
market oriented was the  "50-92" provision of the  1985 bill.  This program
allowed a farmer to set aside acreage or plant a non-program crop on 50
percent of his historical base acreage while receiving 92  percent of his
deficiency payments.  Its objective was to "decouple" the farmer's planting
decisions, on 50 percent of his base acres, from government payments.  The
similar "0-92" provision allowed producers to enter up to 100 percent of
their permitted acreage into conserving uses, and still receive  92 percent
of their deficiency payments.  These provisions, which affected a
2relatively narrow set of programs in the  1985 bill, were conceptual
forerunners of more comprehensive decoupling efforts proposed during the
1980s,  and implemented more fully in the 1990 bill.
Pressures  to augment exports and decrease rising budgetary costs  from
accumulating commodity stocks also  led in 1985  to the creation of the
"marketing loan", which has remained an object of much affection on the
part of commodity groups, although its benefits  (clearing excess
inventories) are more than offset by its cost when the crops  involved are
major export commodities.  Imposed  in 1985 on cotton and rice with
discretionary authority for use on wheat,  feed grains and soybeans, the
marketing loan allows producers to repay their non-recourse  loans at a rate
below the  loan rate when world prices are lower than the loan rate.  A
close cousin to the European Community's (EC's) export restitution, the
marketing loan is  a payment that effectively covers  the difference between
the domestic support price and the world price.  This  device discourages
producers  from forfeiting their commodity to  the Commodity Credit
Corporation  (CCC),  thus keeping government commodity stocks down, and
prevents the U.S. support price from acting as a floor for world market
prices.  In 1990, the marketing loan concept was extended to soybeans, and
will be further extended to  coarse grains and wheat if certain provisions
tied to an unsuccessful GATT round become operative  (see below).
Also established in 1985,  ostensibly to combat decreasing U.S. world
market shares, was the Export Enhancement Program  (EEP).  The program gives
generic certificates to  exporters  that are redeemable for CCC-owned
commodities.  The certificates enable exporters  to sell certain commodities
to specified countries at prices below those of the U.S. market.  While  the
3program has received criticism concerning its  effectiveness in increasing
exports and farm incomes, this criticism has failed to curtail  its use, and
it remains politically popular with the U.S.  Congress.  Bailey  (1989) found
that in 1987-88, EEP was responsible for only an additional ten percent of
U.S. wheat exports  (or ten percent "additionality")  compared to what would
have been shipped without EEP.  The EEP has also been criticized because of
the "cumbersome layer of company bids and CCC bonus bushel authorizations
between our  [the U.S.]  normally efficient private sector exporters and
their customers  overseas"  (Paarlberg, 1990).
The effectiveness of EEP in increasing farm  incomes has also been
questioned.  When the limited "additionality" of the program is weighed
against its  cost, it seems  to be a very questionable mechanism of farm
income support.  For example, between 1985 and 1987 $1.24 billion of CCC
government-owned wheat was given away under the EEP to  increase U.S. wheat
exports by 305 billion bushels.  This  is  a per bushel cost of $4.08,
compared to an average U.S. Gulf export price during the  same period of
$3.16  (Coughlin and Carraro, 1988).  It would have been more cost effective
to destroy the surplus wheat and simply pay farmers the difference.  The
ineffectiveness  of EEP in achieving U.S. farm income  increases says nothing
about its highly destructive impacts on world markets.  While  ostensibly
aimed at  the EC,  the real victims have been grain exporting countries such
as Australia, Canada, and others who have suffered the price declines it
helped to cause.
Of course, neither the inefficiency of EEP  in achieving its  goals nor
its  untoward effects on grain exporters outside the EC are  of much concern
to congressional interests, who find the program plays well with those
4farmers and traders that  it benefits.  After all, what difference does  only
ten percent additionality make  if the taxpayers as  a whole are footing  the
bill?
The 1985 bill also marked the major entrance of environmental
lobbyists into the process of drafting farm legislation.  These groups were
partially successful in their efforts  to  improve the  impacts of agriculture
on the environment, although many of their most cherished programs have
been undercut by traditional agricultural  interests.  For example,  the  1985
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP),  familiar to  many older students  of
American agriculture in the form of its  predecessor, the Soil Bank,
authorized the U.S. Department of Agriculture to pay producers up  to  50
percent of the cost  to establish permanent vegetative cover on
environmentally vulnerable  land, while renting this land from farmers  for
ten years, often at levels twice or more  the going rental rates  in the
county.  These rental payments are paid on "highly erodible" cropland which
is  converted to  erosion-preventing cover crops.  An underlying motivation
for the CRP was to retire acres in corn during 1985, when surpluses were
high, leading many of the converted acres to provide modest, if any,
erosion-reduction benefits  (Taff and Runge, 1988).  The acreage  goal of the
CRP was 40  to 45 million acres by 1990.  As of 1989,  34 million acres have
been converted with an estimated soil erosion savings of 678 million tons
(USDA, 1990).  The  1990 bill continues  the CRP, but criticisms over  its
failure to  target highly vulnerable lands have made an impact, and new
provisions were added to  try to achieve better environmental effects.
Also established in the 1985 bill were the sod- and swamp-buster
programs.  The programs were established to discourage conversion of highly
5erodible land and wetlands.  Under the sod-buster program, producers lose
all future eligibility for deficiency payments  and other USDA program
benefits  if highly erodible grassland or woodland is used for crop
production without appropriate conservation measures.  The swamp-buster
program similarly causes eligibility for USDA programs to cease if a
producer converts wetland areas  to cropland.  A related environmental
addition to  farm policy in 1985 was "conservation compliance."  It requires
producers with highly erodible crop  land to  implement an approved
conservation plan by 1990.  To maintain eligibility for federal program
benefits  the plan must be completed by 1995.  Again, failure  to  comply
leads  to loss of eligibility for program benefits.
Together, the  "death penalty" loss of benefits under conservation
compliance, sod- and swamp-buster provisions, have been criticized as
ineffective, despite  their draconian appearance.  The reason for their
ineffectiveness  is  that they are likely to be undercut precisely when they
are most needed, due to decisions by administrators and legislators who
view the penalties involved as excessive.  An important  feature of the
programs is  that they are  interpreted and enforced by local committees
acting on behalf of USDA.  At the  local level, where the offending farmer
is  likely to be well-known to committee members, a perceived lack of
proportionality between the punishment and the damage makes  it
particularly difficult to  impose the  "death penalty" of loss of all
payments.  To  date, only a handful of such penalties have been handed down,
and many have been overturned on appeal.  The National Wildlife Federation,
after seeking access  to USDA records under the Freedom of Information Act,
found that as of April, 1989, "there  are only 26 producers in the  entire
6United States who have actually lost benefits as a result of swampbuster
violations which occurred between December 23,  1985 and April 15,  1989"
(quoted in Hayden, 1990, p. 583).
In short, what may appear in Washington to be effective environmental
regulations appear to  many farmers  as misguided and ineffective measures
unrelated to farm-level incentives  to produce  (signals also sent from
Washington).  One  obvious amendment to  the provisions would be to  impose
mandatory financial penalties  (fees) for lack of conservation compliance as
well as  sodbusting and swampbusting on a graduated basis,  depending on the
number of acres  affected and the degree of damage.  These fees could either
be subtracted from deficiency payments or (since many farmers receive  few
if any such payments) simply assessed through the EPA or Department  of the
Treasury, entirely outside  the USDA enforcement apparatus.  By graduating
penalties to  fit the magnitude of the damage,  and divorcing them from both
commodity programs and the USDA, environmental goals would be more
realistically and effectively advanced, while reducing the total burden of
penalties on farm level competitiveness.
The  1990 Farm Bill
Drafted amidst widespread farm financial stress resulting from
declining export markets, farm increases,  and land values, the  1985 bill
helped  (together with a rapidly weakening dollar) to rebuild exports and
halt the slide  in land values.  The costs were enormous.  As the  land
market bubble burst, billions of dollars in phony wealth evaporated, and
even huge infusions of federal dollars  ($26 billion in farm program
payments  in 1986 alone) were insufficient to prevent many  farm
foreclosures.  Yet by  1987, aided by drought (and additional drought relief
7payments) net farm income was rebuilding.  On net, farm income achieved
record highs  in 1987, and again in 1988  (USDA, 1989).
The changes  to the  1985 bill that would be implemented in the 1990 Act
were based on four  forces.  The  foremost was  the concurrent budget talks.
With an estimated budget deficit of $161 billion in 1990  and the threat of
across  the board budget cuts under the  so-called Gramm-Rudman law,
Congress was forced to  cut farm program spending as  part of the larger
deficit reduction plan.  The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Reaffirmation Act of 1987  mandated deficit  targets of $64 billion in 1991
and zero by 1993.  If a deficit reduction plan was not submitted in time,
the Amendment called for "sequestration,"  or equal cuts of all eligible
programs, with agriculture prominent among the eligible candidates.  The
need to decrease farm program costs to meet deficit goals was thus the
first force driving the  1990 debate.
The second force driving  the 1990 bill was a by-product of the need
for deficit reduction, coupled to  the greatest of all political
imperatives:  re-election.  How could costs be trimmed in a way that was
least painful to politicians facing races every two or six years?
Obviously the political decision to supplement  farm income conflicts with
cost reduction since  farm income can be raised only through higher
administered price supports or lower costs.  Agricultural costs are hard to
lower because  technology improvements  do not occur easily and without large
expenditures.  Yet higher prices must come from domestic  taxpayers, since
the  international market is  too competitive and domestic demand too
inelastic  (Allen, 1990).  The result was a compromise known as
"flexibility."  Flexibility was an extension of the "0-92" and "50-92"
8provisions of 1985 to include other acreage  "bases."
The  "flexibility"  debate of 1990 occurred in essentially two phases.
The first was an exercise in political fantasy in the spring and early
summer,  in which the members of Congress  indulged the wishes of a variety
of commodity groups with promises of increased levels of support.  During
the fantasy phase, the administration issued  its own version of a wish-
list, a green-colored document detailing its proposals  for a whole  farm
base, or Normal Crop Acreage  (NCA) scheme, together with a variety of
other more-than-incremental proposals.  The NCA proposal would have merged
all existing crop bases and established a single payment determined by
cropping history.  In effect, the NCA scheme was a form of near-total
decoupling, since farmers could produce whatever program crops they chose
on the NCA acres.  Rather than decoupling, the word chosen to  characterize
the NCA proposal was  "flexible base."
The second phase of the farm bill process was driven by budget
realities, during which most of the fantasies  (though not all)  were laid to
rest both in Congress  and at USDA.  As  the "budget summiteers"  flailed away
in attempts  to conform to the Gramm-Rudman deficit reduction targets,  it
became evident that even major attempts to staunch the flow of red would
not contain the hemorrhaging federal budget, especially as recession
deepened.  Agricultural spending was, however, a virtually unanimous
candidate for cuts, and as the need to eliminate roughly $13.6 billion from
agricultural commodity programs over five years emerged from the budget
talks, it dictated that  the agriculture committees and USDA save money
while saving seats.
Since target prices are visible political numbers, and had been the
9focus of much of the fantastic promises made by incumbents  seeking re-
election, the least politically damaging way to  find budget savings was by
reducing the number of base acres  in the major budget programs  (feed grains
and wheat)  that were eligible for deficiency payments.  This budget
pressure dovetailed  (though not perfectly) with the  idea of "flexibility"
which had underpinned the administration's  argument for NCA.  Since total
flexibility under NCA was neither necessary to achieve  the budget  targets
nor desirable to many commodity groups  and their supporters  in Congress, a
"triple-base" emerged as a natural compromise.
The  triple-base acreage concept continues the  idea of splitting the
historical crop acreage  into permitted and idled acreage.  Idled or  reduced
acreage  is mandated under the Acreage Reduction Program  (ARP) and must be
complied with to  receive government payments.  Permitted acreage  is  then
divided into a base for program crops which continue to receive payments,
and a "flexible base,"  set at 15 percent of total for 1991.  This flexible
acreage can be planted to any program crop  that is not a "fruit or
vegetable".  The main effect on crops planted is  likely to be an increase
in oilseeds  (sunflowers, canola) and more soybeans.  The political bargain
was:  "we will give the farmer flexibility, and he will surrender a portion
of his deficiency payment guarantee."  Farmers are forced to make greater
use of market signals to make planting decisions,  although only for  "flex"
acres and the limited number of crops allowed on them.
While much else besides was done or undone in the 1990 farm bill, the
"triple-base" was at  its heart, and was driven primarily by budget
pressures, rather than deeply felt attraction for a clear step in the
direction of decoupling.  Such a step it was, however, giving the
10administration a relatively strong hand going into the GATT meetings, where
it could claim virtue  for having moved in the direction of its  proposed
safety net.
The significance of this move in the direction of flexibility, despite
the many conditions surrounding it,  is potentially far reaching.  Besides
the federal budgetary savings resulting from smaller bases  (see below),  a
more flexible  farm policy, if continued, will lead over time  to more
general decoupling.  As a leading consulting group noted, "Policies that
facilitate flexibility would result in significantly lower production costs
due to  improved yields and lower  input costs"  (Abel, et al.,  1990).
The third force driving the  1990 bill was the environmental movement,
which gained strength between 1985 and 1990.  As 1990 approached, the
diverse environmental lobby sought solidarity in connection with several
key objectives, focusing especially on agricultural chemicals and
groundwater contamination,  together with expansion of the CRP.  While other
issues were raised, such as the illogic of subsidizing irrigation water
when agriculture has become a perennial oversupplier,  they remained in the
background.
One  of several concerns of environmental groups were the  incentives
farm programs give producers to overuse chemicals  and neglect soil
conserving practices.  A variety of case studies indicated that deficiency
payments made to specific crop bases increase and even encourage  the use of
chemicals in agriculture by restricting rotations with other crops  and
placing premiums on extra high yields  (see Young and Painter, 1990).  By
offering deficiency payments  for corn, and not soybeans, the government
tells the  farmer to plant corn and to minimize rotations with legumes,
11substituting fertilizer nitrogen instead.  This leads  to reduced diversity
in cropping patterns and encourages production of chemically intensive
crops  (Reichelderfer and Hinkle,  1989).  Wheat and corn now account for
over  50 percent of all nitrogen fertilizer applications in the United
States  (The Economist, 1989).  Furthermore, the lack of government payments
to livestock production discourages mixed production of livestock and
crops.  When farmers decrease livestock production  in relation to crops
they increase their dependence  on purchased fertilizer nutrients instead of
manure nutrients from livestock (Creason and Runge, 1990).  The structure
of farm programs  thus aggravates the negative environmental impacts  of
agriculture.
While deficiency payments are criticized for their direct effects on
decreased diversity of agricultural operations, the U.S.  income support
programs also encourage chemical use  in a secondary way.  Deficiency
payments are equal to the payment rate  times permitted acreage times county
yield, unless a farmer can demonstrate a historical yield greater than the
county's.  If this  is  the case he can be paid on this higher yield.  As
farmers  try to establish a high historical yield to receive larger
government payments, they use excessive amounts of chemical fertilizers and
pesticides.
The  impact of the current Uruguay Round of trade negotiations  on the
farm bill debate was  the fourth force affecting the 1990 bill.  It was more
subtle  than that of the budget or environment.  Under the auspices of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  (GATT), negotiators in the Uruguay
Round were perceived as potentially affecting what  the U.S. farm bill could
do in terms of restricting trade and subsidizing agriculture.  The United
12States had taken a strong liberal stand in the Uruguay Round and could not
be perceived to be completely out of step in its domestic legislation.
This did not, however, prevent  the 1990 bill from adopting a variety of
illiberal measures, continuing many more, and threatening to raise  trade
distorting subsidies  if the Uruguay Round failed.
The Resulting Bill
Although the  1985 and 1990 farm bills were very similar, their
differences were shaped by the four forces discussed above.  (See Tables 1
and 2 for a comprehensive summary of the changes.)  While each of these
four forces shaped the 1990 U.S.  farm bill  individually, they also
interacted.  The  ideas discussed in Congress  for an NCA and triple-base,
for example, have not only budget but trade and environmental implications
as well.  Greater flexibility in planting allows  farmers to take advantage
of cropping patterns, like corn-soybean rotations, without jeopardizing
their historical corn base.  Total flexibility would eliminate the
incentive to protect crop bases and allow farmers to pursue more
environmentally sound practices.  The flexibility concept is  also
consistent with the U.S. GATT proposal of decreasing agricultural support.
The pressure to decrease spending on farm programs resulted in a cut
of $13.6 billion over five years, or from $54.4 billion to $40.8 billion
over 1991-96.  Cost reductions were achieved through a combination of
shrinking crop bases and some user fees.  In addition to the  triple-base
program, user fees were imposed on sugar, wool, mohair, peanut and tobacco
farmers.
While a paper of this length precludes commodity-by-commodity
13analysis,  a word about the dairy sector  is  in order. 1 Both the  1990 farm
bill and the budget reconciliation act contain provisions which are
significant for the dairy sector.  Support prices are not to  fall below
$10.10/hundredweight  (for 3.67% milk) for several years.  And the producer
assessment, while only 5 cents/hundredweight  the first year, could rise
substantially for producers that expand production.  This  latter provision
provides a mechanism for extracting payments in the event supply exceeds
demand, and may be exercised if output continues to drift upward.
If the experience  of the  1990 bill does not discredit "flexibility,"
then even greater  steps  can be taken in the future to  decouple payments
from production, to reduce acreage set-asides,  and to  loosen requirements
forbidding non-program crops from being grown, so  that  the real advantages
of NCA can be realized.  One area where the 1990 bill  fulfilled growers'
fantasies beyond all expectations was  the sugar regime, which despite a
negative GATT panel ruling, emerged not only unscathed but arguably
enriched from the  legislative process.  Soybeans, which had been held up
for years as a model of "market orientation,"  threw in the towel  and sought
the protection of a marketing loan, which is  in essence no different from
the EC's restitutions, although it  is  set in such a way as  to do the
soybean grower little good.  Having compromised on principle, the soybean
growers  failed to bring home much of a prize.
How does the  "triple-base" actually work?  The program allows
producers to  "flex"  15 percent of their crop base acreage to  other allowed
1An excellent briefing on a commodity-by-commodity basis  is  "The 1990
Farm Act and the 1990 Budget Reconciliation Act:  How Farm Policy
Mechanisms Will Work Under the New Legislation."  Washington, D.C.,  U.S.
Department of Agriculture, November 1990.
14crops while protecting the base they are paid on.  However, the  triple-base
program excludes all fruits, vegetables, potatoes and dry beans from
eligibility.  Crops planted on this  15 percent are eligible for non-
recourse and marketing loans,  but not deficiency payments.  This  new
flexibility allows  farmers to use their management skills to produce the
highest-return crop  on 15 percent of their historical base acreage without
losing eligibility for government payments.
A variety of other, more commodity-specific changes are worth noting.
First, deficiency payments for barley have changed.  The market price used
to establish the deficiency payment rate was previously based on feed and
malt barley.  The  1990 bill requires the market price to be based on feed
barley which will  lead to higher barley deficiency payments.  Producers  of
the higher valued malt barley, however, will be assessed a five percent
charge  to offset the higher payments.
Other changes affect oilseeds.  As noted, the marketing loan,
previously authorized for only cotton and rice, has been extended to
soybeans, sunflowers, flax, canola, and mustard seed.  The primary effect
of the triple-base program will be to allow production of these  oilseeds to
expand.  In the past, farmers were reluctant to plant these crops  in fear
of losing their  "historical" base acreage.  The triple-base now allows
farmers  to expand production of these crops somewhat (e.g.,  by 15 percent)
without seriously jeopardizing their future eligibility.
The highly protected sugar and dairy programs were not immune  to the
aforementioned forces, but largely escaped any substantial trade
liberalization,  suffering mainly at  the hands of budget balancers.  Sugar
processors will be assessed a one percent "market service payment" to
15offset the deficit and appease other commodity groups taking larger cuts.
On balance, many sugar growers  feel they are no worse off, and possibly
even better off, under the  1990 bill.  Minor changes were also made, as
noted, in the dairy program.
Some technical changes were also made to  the basic mechanisms of the
farm program.  First, the market price used to  determine  the deficiency
payment rate was moved from a 5- to  a 12-month average, likely resulting in
lower payments.  Second, the loan rate for the non-recourse loan program
will be set differently.  The loan rate could previously be set between 75
and 85 percent of the 5 year moving average market price.  Now the  loan
rate  cannot fall below 85  percent and cannot be set more than 5 percent
lower than the previous year's rate.
On the  international trade front, the so-called "snapback" provisions
are potentially the most injurious  to  other countries such as Australia.
The 1990 bill included a provisional clause that if there  is no
agricultural agreement by June 30,  1992 among the GATT contracting parties,
the Secretary of Agriculture  is to spend an additional $1 billion on export
subsidies.  The Secretary must also enact the marketing loan program on
wheat and feed grains.  In the case of a GATT agreement that  is not
enforced or not approved by Congress, the Secretary can waive all program
cost reduction measures, raise export subsidies and enact the marketing
loan for wheat and feed grains.  However if an agreement is made,  accepted
and enforced before June 1992, Congress may have to rewrite  the 1990 farm
bill to  incorporate the details of the agreement.
These "snapback" provisions of the bill thus allow for both more EEP
spending and the extension of marketing loans to coarse grains and wheat if
16GATT "fails."  These provisions contain the worst elements of both fantasy
and reality.  On the one hand, they are unlikely to be  funded at levels
which would realistically be required to  truly punish the  EC for  its
intransigence, unless the  $13.6 billion spending target  is  abandoned.  On
the other hand, they will surely provoke retaliation, in all likelihood
leading to even lower prices, especially in the wheat market.  It  is  the
threat of such retaliation, due  to failure in the Uruguay Round, that makes
the breakdown of talks  in Brussels  of real concern.
As of this writing, the likelihood for a meaningful package of reforms
in the areas of market access,  internal  supports, and export subsidies in
GATT are slim.  When the  EC, together with Japan and South Korea, rejected
the Hellstrom compromise proposal in Brussels on December 6, they signaled
that even if a final deal is  achieved it will fall short of the proposed
compromise.  That compromise called for 30 percent reductions  in both
export subsidies  and internal supports on a base year of 1990  (as  distinct
from the EC's proposed base of 1986)  and 30 percent increases  in market
access over five years, with a minimum 5 percent market access  guarantee at
the outset.
The prospects  in GATT are either for something short of the Hellstrom
compromise, or nothing at all.  In terms  of immediate  impact on the U.S.
farm sector and its balance sheet, either outcome would take several years
to show up, unless a trade war erupted quickly in the  face of failure.
Something close  to the Hellstrom compromise would reinforce the logic of
the "triple-base,"  by mandating further reductions  in deficiency payments,
and would create an excuse for ending the  ill-advised EEP program.  The
market access provisions would also assist in lower import quotas in sugar,
17and to a lesser degree  in peanuts, dairy and other border-protected
commodities.  These effects would occur over a relatively long time  (five
to ten years) giving the farm sector plenty of opportunity to adjust.
One of the ironies of the debate over the Uruguay Round in farm
circles has been the paranoia GATT has produced, which has been fed by
neopopulist opponents of  liberalization.  These  opponents are usually
admirers  of supply control, and sometimes of  the European Community.  If
the GATT talks  fail completely, the  irony will be that the retaliation
mandated by the  "snapback" provisions of the 1990 bill will actually fan
the flames  of protectionism,  leading to  attacks on the EC, Japan and South
Korea, which together constitute huge agricultural export customers.  If
farmers are  looking for something to be paranoid about,  it  should be a
trade war, rather  than GATT.  Such a trade war will have  two primary
effects.  First, it will further depress world markets, leading to  even
lower commodities prices, especially in the wheat market.  Second, it will
cost money, which unless Congress  is prepared to reverse  its  stand on
agricultural spending, could mean even less for deficiency payments.  If
the trade war spreads beyond agriculture  to  include other sectors of the
economy, it would deepen the current global recession, lowering profits and
government revenues, putting even more downward pressure on both the demand
for agricultural exports and the ability of government to subsidize them
and the farm sector.
The environmental interest groups came out of the 1990 farm bill
debate relatively satisfied.  First, the CRP was extended and expanded.
The deadline for the enrollment of 40 to  45 million acres was extended to
1995.  More  important, however, is  the expansion of eligible land to
18include areas subject  to water erosion and/or groundwater contamination.
Now eligible for enrollment are  shelterbelts, windbreaks and marginal
pasture land planted to trees.
The CRP also served as the model for a new Wetlands Reserve Program
(WRP).  The program calls for the enrollment of up to  one million acres  to
be paid for easements  of 30  years or  longer.  Priority is  put on wetlands
that enhance bird and wildlife habitat.  The WRP is  also established to
help fund the restoration of wetlands by  farmers before the lands  are
enrolled in the program.
Arising from the neglect of water issues  in farm policy, water quality
was addressed with a new Water Quality Incentive Program  (WQIP).  The
program helps producers develop  and implement farm management plans that
protect water quality and improve wildlife habitat.  Producers can receive
up  to $3,500 a year  in incentive payments and $1,500  in cost share
assistance on approved plans;  additional monies are available if the plan
improves wildlife habitat.  The enrollment goal set for  this program is  10
million acres by 1995.  A producer's base and payment yield are protected
under this program even if acres or yields are reduced because of the
implemented practices.
As mentioned above, the conservation compliance provisions and the
sod- and swamp-buster programs have received much criticism for their
inequitable penalties.  This problem was partially addressed in the 1990
bill.  Penalties  are now smaller and more graduated for farmers who
accidentally plow up highly erodible land or wetlands; between $750 and
$10,000 on wetlands and $500 and $5,000 for drylands.  However, a farmer
whom Durposefullv violates the programs would be subject to  stricter and
19quicker penalties.  According to one Sierra Club official, the program as
of 1985 was a "well-intentioned program" while "In 1990,  it's a well-
written program"  (Agweek, 1990).
A new environmental policy to  supplement  those existing is called the
Integrated Farm Management  (IFM) program.  Farmers submit three-  to  five-
year plans for  their farms which combine overall productivity with
profitability.  The plans must prevent soil erosion, maintain or  improve
soil fertility, conserve  and protect water and interrupt pest cycles.
Through the  life of  the plan 20 percent of base acreage, which is
preserved, must be committed to  a resource-conserving crop.  Producers
enrolled in the program will continue to collect deficiency payments as  if
they were planting program crops.  Three million acres is  the enrollment
goal for 1995.
The  final environmental provisions to be achieved in the bill address
pesticides and organic  foods.  Under the  first provision, farmers are
required to keep records on their use of restricted pesticides for  two
years.  While the records are to be kept confidential by the government
they can be made available  to state and federal agencies  and health care
officials.  In addition, national standards have been set for food that is
labeled "organic."
The Future of U.S. Farm Policy
The false promise of budget reductions under the Gramm-Rudman deficit
reduction bill is now acknowledged, and the federal deficit is  running
higher in 1990 than ever.  Thus, budgetary pressures will continue to be a
force  in future farm legislation.  They are also  likely to make certain of
the political promises of the 1990 bill, notably the "snapback provisions,"
20difficult to implement, since  the Treasury is  empty.  The movement to
continue  introducing greater flexibility into farm programs  is very strong,
since budgets will keep pinching, and politicians will keep squirming,
seeking compromises which save money while saving seats.  These pressures
to decrease program costs, environmental interventions and slow but
inexorable movements  toward more open trade,  all support the move  to
greater flexibility in U.S. farm programs.  While it  is  difficult to
predict the outcome  of the Uruguay Round, if some accommodation is  found it
will set the  tone  for future farm bills.  If there  is  no agreement, then
bilateral disputes  and the possibility of a wider trade war  is possible.
While the results of the Uruguay Round will affect farm policy, less-
than-multilateral  trade liberalization  is also  likely to have an impact,
such as the Japanese liberalization of beef and citrus markets,  the
withdrawal of government intervention in New Zealand and similar steps by
Australia, Canada and Sweden.  These changes  indicate that countries may
have to change at  their own pace  and in their own ways regardless of GATT
pressures.
Summary
While the Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990  is  a
lineal descendent of the  1985 bill, the differences that do exist are
important.  The  1990 bill promises to  be less  costly than its  1985
counterpart, due  to a mixture of decreased deficiency payments from the
triple-base program, and origination fees and assessments for programs  such
as sugar, tobacco, wool, mohair,  peanuts and dairy.  An extended and
expanded CRP;  more equitable penalties for conservation compliance,  swamp
buster and sod buster programs;  a new Wetlands Reserve Program;  a water
21quality program and the Integrated Farm Management program all illustrate
the growing concern for natural resources.  While the GATT negotiations did
not directly affect  the farm bill, provisions added may result  in increased
trade tensions  if an agreement is not reached.
The same forces which shaped the  1990 bill  -- the budget crisis,
farming flexibility, environmental concerns and multilateral  trade
negotiations  -- promise  to continue  their influence on U.S.  farm policy for
the remainder of the nineties.
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24TABLE 1
General Features of the  1985 and 1990 Bills
Farm, Trade and
Food Security Act of 1985  Conservation Act of 1990
........................................---------.----------..--------.--
Crop Base  Five year average of  Same as FSA with 15%
Acreage  acreage per crop.  of base designated as
flexible and not eligible
for deficiency payments.
Deficiency  Difference between  Same as FSA except
Payments  target price and market  market price based on
price or  loan rate,  12 month average, not
whichever is higher,  5 months.
times acreage  and yield.
Marketing  Cotton and rice  Program extended to
Loans  producers repay loans at  soybeans,  sunflowers,
lower rate if world  flax, canola, rapeseed
price falls below loan  and mustard seed.
rate.  Discretionary for
wheat and feed grains.
Price Support  Producers take out non-  Loan rate must now be
Payments  recourse loans with the  set at no less than
CCC, using commodities  85 percent of  five
as collateral.  Loan  year moving average
rate set between 75  market price.  Rate
and 85  percent of  cannot be set more
five year moving  than  5 percent lower
average market price,  than previous year's
rate.
Farm Program  Commodity program  Same as FSA, except
Payment Limits  payments limited to  payment limit to honey
$50,000 per person and  producers  falls from
$100,000 for disaster  $250,000  to $125,000





Federal Crop  Subsidized insurance  Federal Crop Insurance
Insurance  program on 50 crops  Corporation to review
Program  varying by county.  new types of policies.




Market  Use of Section 32  funds  No change from FSA.
Stabilization  to  encourage consumption
of Perishables  of commodities by
purchase, export and
diversion programs.
Marketing  Allows producers  to  No  change  from FSA.
Agreements  promote orderly
and Orders  marketing and to
collectively influence
price or quality of
certain commodities.
Disaster  When substantial loss  No change  from FSA.
Payments  creates economic
emergency and crop
insurance  is  insufficient.




Dairy Policy  CCC buys dairy products,  Same as FSA, except
supply  is reduced  limit on government
through diversion and  purchases and fees
termination programs and  assessed on producers
41 marketing orders  and processors.
oversee distribution and
pricing.
Export  EEP and Export Credit  If no GATT agreement
Subsidies  Guarantee Programs  by June 30,  1992,  an
subsidize sales with CCC  additional $1 billion
commodities,  is  to be spent on
subsidies and marketing
loans are to be instituted
on wheat and feed grains.
Conservation  Convert highly erodible  Extends enrollment
Reserve  crop  land to conserving,  period to 1995.
Program  non-commercial use by
offering annual rental
payments.
26Wetlands  Prohibit USDA program  Smaller penalties for
Conservation  benefits to producers  violation of "swamp
that convert wetlands to  buster" program.
cropland.  Creates Wetland Reserve
Program to restore and
attain long term easements
for wetlands.
Wilderness  Not specified.  Provides cost share
Conservation  assistance for
production plans which
improve wildlife habitat.
Water Research  Provide plans and  Creates program that
and Management  assistance  to state and  offers  incentives to
local governments to  adapt production
protect ground and  practices  that reduce
surface water quantity  the release of
and quality,  agricultural chemicals.
Chemical  Not specified.  Farmers required to
Standards  keep records on use of
restricted pesticides.
Rural  Changes criterion for  Creates Rural Development
Community  receiving water and  Administration, expands
Assistance  waste facility loans and  grant program and waste
grants and guarantees  disposal systems,  and
loans made to non-profit  provides funds  for rural
rural development and  communications networks.
finance corporations.
Part-time  Maintains FmHA Small  Nothing specified.
Farming  Farmer Training and
Assistance  Technical Assistance
Program.
Rural Credit  Requires more FmHA  Cuts direct FmHA loans
guaranteed loans,  adds  by 75 percent and
joint farming operations  increases  guaranteed
to FmHA eligibility and  loan program funds.
studies need for
insurance to protect FCS.
Food for Peace  Makes commodities  Commodities to be made
available through  available on multi-
long-term credit, as  year basis.  Title III
donations for emergency  deleted and replaced
relief and authorizes  with Food for
food for development  Development program.
projects.
27Other Foreign  Food for Progress  Food for Progress
Food  created to support  extended to assist
Assistance  countries moving to  middle  income and




Food Safety  Continues  current  Same as FSA.
inspection of meat and
poultry, applies U.S.
standards  to  imported
poultry and calls  for
study of product purity
and inspection regulations.
Agricultural  Continues National  Increase in Agricultural
Production  Agricultural Research,  Research Service Programs
Research  Extension and Teaching  funds.  Programs  for
Policy Act and creates  Supplemental and Alternative
Technology Development  Crops Research extended.
Research Program to  Established Agricultural
develop technology for  Science and Technology
use on small and  Review Board.
medium-sized farms.
Environmental  Creates Agricultural  Pilot projects on
Research  Productivity Research  Integrated Pest
program which stresses  Management are
low-input  sustainable  established.  National




Commodity Specific Features of 1985 and 1990 Bills
Food, Agriculture,
Food Security  Conservation and
Act of 1985  Trade Act of 1990
Barley  Non-recourse loans and  Bases market price on
deficiency payments on  feed barley, with malt
barley base acreage  if  barley being assessed
comply with ARP.1 Three  5% of  the target price.
year FOR loans.2 CRP  Market price for deficiency
set-aside.3 Export  payments moves from 5- to
Enhancement Program.4 12-month average.  Fifteen percent
of barley base must enter the
triple-base program.5
Corn and  Non-recourse loans  and  Market price  for deficiency
Sorghum  deficiency payments  on  payments moves from 5- to
corn and sorghum base  12-month average.  Fifteen
if comply with ARP.  percent of corn or sorghum
Three year FOR loans.  base must enter the  triple-
CRP set-aside.  Export  base program.
Enhancement Program.
1 Acreage Reduction Program requires producers to reduce planted
acreage to be eligible for CCC non-recourse loans and deficiency payments.
2 Farmer Owned Reserve non-recourse loans given for  three years on
stored wheat and feed grain. Grain is not released until market price
reaches  the release price.
3Conservation Reserve Program lets farmers contract to take erodible
land out  of production for payment.
4 Export Enhancement Program subsidies exports with generic  CCC
commodity certificates.
5 Triple-base program requires  farmers to "flex"  at least  10%  and up
to  15%  of their base acreage to other program or non-program crops.  Base
acreage is  protected and the crops planted on the "flex" acreage is  not
eligible for deficiency payments.
29Cotton  Non-recourse loans and  Reduced acreage can be
deficiency payments with  planted to minor oilseed
ARP compliance.  CRP  or experimental or
set-aside.  Marketing  industrial non-program
loan program offers lower  crops.  Fifteen percent of
loan repayment rate and  cotton base must enter the
issues  CCC certificates  triple-base program.
to cover differential
for upland variety.6
Dairy  CCC supports prices  Government purchases
through purchases of  limited to 7 billion
dairy products.  pounds, with assessments
Marketing orders  being charged to cover cost
regulate prices  and  of purchases beyond this
provide blend price  limit.  Producers and
based on milk usage.  processors are subject to
Section 22  import  an assessment per
controls.7 hundredweight.
Fruit &  Marketing orders and  Marketing orders and
Vegetable  agreements manage supply  agreements are continued.
through allotments,
allocations, reserve
pools or market flow
controls.  Orders also
control quality and
support marketing.
Honey  Non-recourse loan  Decreases  $250,000
program to producers and  payment limit to $125,000.
marketing cooperatives  A service fee of 1% was
with repayment rate  also established.
below support price.
Oats  Non-recourse loans.  Market price for deficiency
Optional target prices.  payments move from 5- to
Three year FOR loans.  12-month average.  Fifteen
Limited cross-compliance  percent of oat base must
exemption if comply with  be put into triple-base
ARP.  program.
6 Marketing loans allow producers to repay non-recourse  loans at
levels below the support price when loan rate is  above world price.
7 Section 22 allows the President to restrict imports by quotas or
fees  if imports interfere with Federal price support programs.
8 Cross-compliance requires  that farmers whom participate  in  a major
program for one crop must meet program provisions for other major crops
which they farm.
30Peanuts  Peanuts sold under  Continues program yet adds
marketing quota or as  1% service fee.
additional peanuts for
crushing or export.9
Section 22  import quotas.
Loans  available to
grower associations.
Rice  Non-recourse loans and  Reduced acreage can be
deficiency payments  if  planted to minor oilseeds
comply with ARP.  or experimental or
Marketing loans  industrial non-program
available.  Exports  crops.  Fifteen percent of
promoted by PL 48010,  rice base must go  into
GSM-102 11 and TEA12. triple-base program.
CRP set-aside.
Rye  Non-recourse loan  Market price for deficiency payments
program.  CRP set-aside.  moves from 5- to  12-month average.
Fifteen percent of rye base must go
into triple-base program.
Soybeans  Non-recourse loans.  Marketing loan established.
Discretionary marketing  Service  fee of 2% of loan
loans.  CRP set-aside.  rate will be charged.
Exports promoted by
credit guarantee
programs PL 480 and EEP.
Sugar  Non-recourse loans made  Loan level maintained at
to processors  if  18(  per pound.  Market
producers are offered  service payment of 1%
the price.  Import quotas  to be assessed on
are  set to achieve a  processors.
market Stabilization
price which avoids loan
forfeitures.
9 Marketing quotas represent USDA estimates of domestic and export
needs and restricts the amount of the commodity producers can sell  at the
support price.
10 PL 480 or Food for Peace authorizes  long term credit sales at  low
interest rates  or donation of commodities to developing countries.
11 GSM-102 is  one of two programs which guarantees the credit of
export customers. This program is  for short term (3  years) credit, while
GSM-103  is  for long term (3-5 years) credit guarantee.
12  Targeted Export Assistance program gives generic certificates in
payment  for targeted promotion activities.
31Tobacco  Producers are eligible  Same as FSA except for




assessments to  cover
program costs.  Tariffs
on imported tobacco.
Wheat  Non-recourse loans  and  Market price for
deficiency payments paid  deficiency payments moves
on wheat base acreage if  from 5- to  12-month
comply with ARP.  CRP  average.  Fifteen percent
set-aside.  Exports  of wheat base must go  into
promoted with EEP and  triple-base program.
credit guarantee
programs.
Wool and  Payments based on  Program continued with
Mohair  bringing national  payment limit decreased
average producer return  from $200,000 to $125,000
up to parity based  per producer.  Service  fee
support price.  Quotas  of 1% established.
on wool imports.
32